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 1. Introduction 
In the wake of the 2007–2009 economic crisis, the virtues and vices of financial globalisation 
are being re-evaluated. Financial linkages between countries, in particular in the form of bank 
lending, have been singled out as a key channel of international crisis transmission. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the G-20 have identified the volatility of cross-border 
capital flows as a priority related to the reform of the global financial system (IMF, 2010). A 
pertinent question that is high on the policy and academic agenda is why cross-border bank 
lending to some countries is relatively stable whereas it is more volatile in other cases. The 
recent crisis, which originated in the US sub-prime market but spilled over to much of the 
developed and developing world, provides for an ideal testing ground to answer this question. 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, syndicated cross-border lending 
declined on average by 53 percent compared to pre-crisis levels (Dealogic Loan Analytics). 
Figure 1 illustrates, however, that the magnitude of this reduction in international bank 
lending differed substantially across countries. 
Figure 1 
Distribution of the change in cross-border lending after the Lehman Brothers collapse
This figure shows the distribution across destination countries of the change in the average monthly cross-border syndicated lending inflows
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers compared to the pre-crisis period. The pre-crisis period is defined as January 2005 to July 2007 and the
post-Lehman period as October 2008 to October 2009. Each bar indicates the number of destination countries that experienced a post-Lehman
change in bank lending that falls within the percentage bracket on the horizontal axis. For instance, there were 11 countries to which cross-
border syndicated bank lending declined by between 25 and 50 per cent while there were only 2 countries that experienced an increase in cross-
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In this paper we hypothesise that cross-border lending was reduced most to countries where 
banks were unable to limit the increase in uncertainty through generating additional 
information about borrowers and had to resort to credit rationing instead. We use unique data 
  2on lending by international banks to corporate borrowers in a large number of countries to put 
this theoretical prior to the test and to demonstrate that access to borrower information is a 
key determinant of lending stability in times of crisis. 
The use of micro data allows us to make a significant contribution to the emerging literature 
on the transmission of the recent crisis. A number of papers use aggregate data from the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to study the 2008/2009 contraction in international 
bank lending. They find that international banks contributed to the spreading of the crisis and 
that this impact was most severe in the case of banking sectors that were vulnerable to US 
dollar funding shocks (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011), that displayed a low average level of 
profitability or high average expected default frequency (McGuire and Tarashev, 2008), or 
that had a poor average stock-market performance (Herrmann and Mihaljek, 2010). Takáts 
(2010) shows that supply factors –proxied by the volatility of the S&P 500 Financial Index– 
were a more important driver of the reduction in lending to emerging markets than local 
demand. Finally, Hoggarth, Mahadeva and Martin (2010) argue on the basis of aggregate BIS 
data and information from market participants that the reversal in cross-border credit flows 
may have been concentrated in banks’ ‘non-core’ or ‘peripheral’ markets. The authors 
speculate that banks reduced their exposures in particular to those countries where they knew 
borrowers less well. 
While these papers provide broad insights into the determinants of aggregate bank lending, 
they do not tell us what type of banks transmitted the crisis to what type of borrowers in what 
type of countries. It remains unclear whether banks reduced their cross-border lending across 
the board or only to particular ‘non-core’ countries. This is not only unfortunate from an 
academic perspective but also from the point of view of policy-makers who want to gauge 
international banks’ commitment to their country during times of crisis. 
An empirical analysis to answer these finer questions needs to be based on bank-level data, 
ideally on loan flows from individual banks to individual countries over a prolonged period 
of time. Data should contain lending to various countries from individual banks (to exploit 
within-bank variation) as well as lending flows from various banks to individual countries (to 
control for credit demand at the country level). And finally, such data should preferably 
contain the individual deals that underlie credit flows, so that micro-information on 
borrowers and on inter-bank cooperation can be exploited. We use data on cross-border 
syndicated bank lending that fulfil all of these requirements. 
  3Loan syndications – groups of financial institutions that jointly provide a loan to a corporate 
borrower – are one of the main channels of cross-border debt finance to both developed and 
emerging markets.
1 In 2007, international syndicated loans made up over 40 percent of all 
cross-border funding to US borrowers and more than two-thirds of cross-border flows to 
emerging markets.
2 We concentrate on the 118 largest banks in the cross-border syndicated 
loan market, which together account for over 90 per cent of this market. We use data on 
individual cross-border deals to construct, for each of these banks, a monthly snapshot of 
their credit flows to firms in individual countries. This allows us to compare post-crisis and 
pre-crisis lending by each bank to each country. 
We use regression techniques to explain this lending behaviour through variables that 
measure the ability of banks to screen and monitor borrowers in particular destination 
countries. We control for changes in credit demand and other destination country variables by 
using destination country-fixed effects – in effect analysing how different banks change their 
lending to the same country differently (within-country comparison). Moreover, we control 
for bank-specific characteristics by using bank-fixed effects; in effect analysing how a 
particular bank changes its lending to different countries differently (within-bank 
comparison). This combination of country- and bank-fixed effects allows us to narrowly 
focus on information variables that are specific to particular bank-country pairs and to 
empirically isolate the impact of these variables on the stability of international lending 
relationships. 
We find that during the global financial crisis banks were better able to keep lending to 
countries that are geographically close, in which they are well integrated into a network of 
domestic co-lenders, and in which they had gained experience by building relationships with 
(repeat) borrowers. For emerging markets, where trustworthy ‘hard’ information is less 
readily available and a local presence might be more important, we also find (weak) evidence 
that the presence of a local subsidiary stabilises cross-border lending. Our analysis shows that 
information asymmetries between banks and their foreign customers are an important 
determinant of the resilience of cross-border lending during a crisis. Even in a ‘hard 
information’ setting, such as the market for syndicated corporate loans, access to soft 
information seems to be important. 
                                                 
1 We define emerging markets as all countries except high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. Although Slovenia and South Korea were recently reclassified as high-income 
countries, we still consider them as emerging markets. 
2 Cross-border funding is defined as the sum of international syndicated credit, international money market 
instruments, and international bonds and notes (Bank for International Settlements, Tables 10, 14
a, and 14
b). 
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crisis, but also complements a number of studies that analyse financial contagion through 
international bank lending. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001, 2003), for example, find that 
international banks that are exposed to a financial shock –either in their home or in a third 
country– reduce lending to other countries. Jeanneau and Micu (2002) show that cross-border 
lending is determined by macroeconomic factors, such as the business cycle and the monetary 
policy stance, in both home and host country. Buch, Carstensen and Schertler (2010) analyse 
the cross-border transmission of shocks and find that interest rate differentials and also 
energy prices influence international bank lending. This paper goes beyond assessing the 
impact of macroeconomic factors on international bank lending. We instead test a number of 
hypotheses on mechanisms that banks use to mitigate information problems that hitherto have 
not been analysed in an international context. 
Our paper is also related to the work of Schnabl (2011) and Aiyar (2010) who focus on the 
reduction in cross-border lending to Peruvian banks after the 1998 Russian default and to 
British banks after the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse, respectively. Both authors find that 
these external funding shocks forced banks to contract domestic lending. We also focus on 
the Lehman Brothers collapse as an external liquidity shock, but instead assess how this 
shock was transmitted across borders to both bank and non-bank borrowers. 
In addition, this paper adds to the literature on multinational banking. A number of papers 
demonstrate that foreign affiliates of multinational banks can act as shock transmitters. Peek 
and Rosengren (1997, 2000) show how the drop in Japanese stock prices in 1990 led 
Japanese bank branches in the US to reduce credit. Imai and Takarabe (2011) find that 
Japanese nationwide city banks transmitted local real estate price shocks to other prefectures 
within Japan as well. In line with this evidence, Allen, Hryckiewicz, Kowalewski and Tümer-
Alan (2010), De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), and Popov and Udell (2010) find that 
lending by multinational bank subsidiaries depends on the financial strength of the parent 
bank. Our paper is related to this literature as we compare cross-border lending by banks with 
and without a subsidiary in a particular destination country. In doing so we connect the 
literature on the stability of international and multinational bank lending. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on distance and borrower 
information and derives the theoretical priors that we test in this paper. Section 3 explains our 
data and econometric methodology, after which Section 4 describes our empirical findings, a 
set of robustness tests, and extensions of our main results. Section 5 concludes. 
  52. Distance, borrower information, and lending stability  
There exists by now a substantial theoretical and empirical literature that analyses how banks 
(try to) overcome agency problems vis-à-vis (potential) customers. Banks screen new 
borrowers and monitor existing ones to reduce information asymmetries and the agency 
problems associated with debt (Allen, 1990). Banks’ ability to screen and monitor varies 
across borrowers: agency problems are more pronounced for opaque and small companies. 
Banks need to exercise considerable effort to collect ‘soft’ information about such borrowers, 
for instance by building up a lending relationship over time (Rajan, 1992; Ongena, 1999). 
When screening and monitoring is difficult, the scope for adverse selection and moral hazard 
remains high and banks resort to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Because opaque 
borrowers are particularly difficult to screen and monitor they experience more credit 
rationing than transparent firms (Berger and Udell, 2002). 
Banks’ screening and monitoring intensity also varies over time. An adverse economic shock 
increases the marginal benefits of screening and monitoring as the proportion of firms with a 
high default probability increases (Ruckes, 2004).
3 During a recession or crisis the net worth 
of firms drops, adverse selection and moral hazard increase, and banks step up their screening 
and monitoring (Rajan, 1994 and Berger and Udell, 2004). However, banks face difficulties 
in offsetting increased agency problems if borrowers are opaque. In response to an adverse 
shock they therefore resort to credit rationing of such intransparent borrowers in particular 
(‘flight to quality’, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996). In a similar vein, we expect that 
during the recent crisis banks reduced cross-border lending the most to countries where they 
were unable to limit the increase in uncertainty through generating additional borrower 
information and resorted to credit rationing instead. Economic theory suggests a number of 
factors that influence whether a bank is able to limit agency problems. 
First, we consider the geographical distance between the bank and its borrowers (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994; 2002). Distant borrowers are more difficult to screen and monitor and banks 
therefore lend less to far-away clients (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1971; Hauswald and Marquez, 
2006). In line with geographical credit rationing, Portes, Rey, and Oh (2001); Buch (2005); 
and Giannetti and Yafeh (2008) document a negative relationship between distance and 
international asset holdings, including bank loans. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) show how 
the negative relationship between bank-borrower distance and credit availability is largely 
                                                 
3 By contrast, during boom periods default probabilities are low and the advantages of screening and monitoring 
– such as reduced shirking by firm management – mostly benefit shareholders rather than creditors. 
  6due to the inability to collect and make use of ‘soft’ information. We therefore expect that, in 
line with an international flight to quality, distant firms were rationed more by international 
banks during the crisis than less remote companies. That is, we expect a negative relationship 
between distance and bank lending stability. 
A mechanism for banks to overcome distance constraints in cross-border lending is to set up 
a local subsidiary (Mian, 2006; Giannetti and Yafeh, 2008). A presence on the ground 
reduces information asymmetries as local loan officers are better placed to extract soft 
information from borrowers. Developing closer ties with clients may allow the bank to 
continue to lend to borrowers during periods of high uncertainty because screening and 
monitoring can be stepped up quite easily. Local staff on the ground can also make it easier 
for a bank to generate (and subsequently monitor) new cross-border deals. Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) argue that (small) banks that use soft information may 
sustain longer relationships with clients because they provide clients with better lending 
terms, compared to banks that lack access to such information. In a similar vein, we 
hypothesise that a bank with a subsidiary may find it easier to continue to lend cross-border, 
since the subsidiary generates (soft) information that allows the bank to refrain from 
adjusting lending terms too much. Finally, because soft information is not easily transferable 
across banks, international banks with a local subsidiary may have greater market power over 
firms than banks without a subsidiary. Firms that are a client of a bank with a local presence 
may find it more costly to switch to another bank during a crisis and the lending relationship 
may therefore be more stable. 
While a local subsidiary reduces the physical distance between the firm and the loan officer, 
it also creates ‘functional distance’ within the bank.
4 Banks may experience difficulties in 
efficiently passing along (soft) information from the subsidiary to headquarters (Aghion and 
Tirole, 1997; Stein, 2002). Liberti and Mian (2009) show that when the hierarchical distance 
between the information collecting agent and the officer that ultimately approves a loan is 
large, less ‘soft’ or subjective and more ‘hard’ information is used. If the incentives of 
subsidiary managers are not aligned with those of the parent bank, internal agency costs 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) may hamper cross-border lending as well. Such costs increase 
with distance if parent banks find it more difficult to supervise management in far-away 
                                                 
4 Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena (2009) provide an excellent overview of the literature on the relationship 
between distance, banks’ organisational structure and the supply of bank lending. 
  7places (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000).
5 Whether the presence of a subsidiary makes 
cross-border lending more stable or not therefore depends on whether the positive effect of 
the shorter distance between loan officer and borrower is offset by the negative effect of a 
longer within-bank functional distance. 
Another way for banks to overcome distance constraints in cross-border lending is to 
cooperate with domestic banks. These banks may possess a comparative advantage in 
reducing information asymmetries vis-à-vis local firms (Mian, 2006; Houston, Itzkowitz, and 
Naranjo, 2007), as they share the same language and culture and may have a more intimate 
knowledge of local legal, accounting, and other institutions and their impact on firms. In line 
with this, Carey and Nini (2007) find that local bank participation leads to larger, longer, and 
cheaper syndicated loans. Borrowers may still value the presence of foreign banks if these are 
part of international bank networks that provide firms with a deeper and more liquid loan 
base, further reducing borrowing costs (Houston et al., 2007). By (repeatedly) co-lending 
with domestic banks, international banks may gradually increase their own knowledge of 
local firms and reduce information asymmetries. We therefore expect that international banks 
that are well-integrated in a lending network of domestic banks may find it easier to continue 
lending during a period of severe financial stress. 
Finally, the negative effect of distance on the ability to screen and monitor may become less 
acute the more experience a bank has built up in lending to certain borrowers. De Haas and 
Van Horen (2010) find that in the wake of the Lehman collapse agency problems increased 
less for banks lending to firms, industries, or countries that they had been lending to before. 
In line with this, we expect that during the financial crisis banks reduced their lending to a 
lesser extent to countries where they had built up substantial pre-crisis lending experience. 
Section 3 now describes the data and methodology that we use to test to what extent distance, 
subsidiary presence, cooperation with domestic banks, and lending experience influenced the 





                                                 
5 Alessandrini, Presbitero, and Zazzaro (2009) show for Italy that a greater functional distance between loan 
officers and bank headquarters adversely affects the availability of credit to local firms. 
  83. Data and econometric methodology 
3.1. Data 
Our main data source is the Dealogic Loan Analytics database, which provides 
comprehensive market information on virtually all syndicated loans issued since the 1980s. 
We use this database to download all syndicated loans to private borrowers worldwide during 
the 2005-09 period and then break each syndicated loan down into the portions provided by 
the individual banks that make up the syndicate. Loan Analytics provides precise information 
on loan breakdown for about 25 per cent of all loans. For these loans we allocate the exact 
loan portions to the individual lenders in the syndicate.
6 For the other 75 per cent of the loans 
we have to use a rule to allocate loan portions. For our baseline regressions we use the 
simplest rule possible: we divide the loan equally among all lenders. In Section 4.2 we 
describe various robustness tests that show that our results continue to hold when we allocate 
the 75 per cent of the loan sample in various other ways over the syndicate members. In total 
we split 23,237 syndicated loans into 108,530 loan portions. 
We then use these loan portions to reconstruct the volume and country distribution of 
individual banks’ monthly lending over the sample period. We focus on actual cross-border 
lending, which we define as loans where the nationality of the (parent) bank is different from 
the nationality of the borrower and where the loan is provided by the parent (Citibank lending 
from the United States to a Polish firm), rather than by a subsidiary (Citibank Poland 
participating in a syndicated loan to a Polish firm). The vast majority (94 per cent) of cross-
border lending is of the former type and therefore included in our dataset. 
Next, we identify all commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, and investment 
banks that at the group level provided at least 0.01 per cent of global syndicated cross-border 
lending and participated in at least twenty cross-border loans in 2006. This leaves us with 118 
banks from 36 countries, both advanced (75 banks) and emerging markets (43 banks). 
Together these banks lent to borrowers in 60 countries and accounted for over 90 per cent of 
all cross-border syndicated lending in 2006. 
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix list all banks and destination countries in our sample, 
respectively. Table A1 also shows each bank’s country of incorporation, as well as its 
absolute and relative position in the global market for cross-border lending. Although most 
                                                 
6 See De Haas and Van Horen (2010) for a comparison of syndicated loans with full versus limited information 
on loan distribution in Loan Analytics and for evidence on the limited differences between both. 
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which each make up more than 3 per cent of the market: RBS/ABN Amro (8.3 per cent), 
Deutsche Bank (5.4), BNP Paribas (5.1), Citigroup (4.9), Barclays (4.7), Credit Suisse (3.6), 
Mitsubishi UFJ (3.4), JPMorgan (3.2), and Commerzbank (3.1).
7 
For each of these banks we calculate monthly cross-border lending volumes to individual 
destination countries for the pre-crisis period (January 2005-July 2007) and the period after 
the Lehman collapse (October 2008-October 2009). Note that we disregard the intermediate 
August 2007-September 2008 period that encompasses the early stage of the crisis. This 
allows us to make a clean comparison between the most severe crisis period, the year after 
the unexpected collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the period before the start of interbank 
liquidity problems in August 2007. In Section 4.2 we discuss robustness tests that show that 
our results continue to hold when we change this time window. 
We use the percentage change between these post-Lehman and pre-crisis average amounts of 
cross-border lending as our first dependent variable (Volume). We also construct a dummy 
variable Sudden stop that is 1 for each bank-country pair where the decline in bank lending 
during the crisis exceeded 75 per cent. Finally, we create a dependent variable that measures 
for each destination country the percentage change in the number of syndicates that a lender 
arranged or participated in (Number).
8 To reduce the probability that our results are affected 
by outliers we exclude observations above the 97
th percentile for Volume and Number. 
Table 1 shows that our dataset includes 2,146 bank-country pairs which are approximately 
evenly split between emerging markets and advanced countries. On average an international 
bank was lending to firms in 18 different countries before the demise of Lehman Brothers. 
The table shows that banks reduced their lending on average by 64 per cent during the crisis 
to any destination country (60 per cent to advanced countries and 68 per cent to emerging 
markets). The variable Sudden stop indicates that banks let their lending even decline by 75 
per cent or more in 62 per cent of the countries. Sudden stops were more common in 
emerging markets (68 per cent) compared to advanced markets (54 per cent). In terms of 
                                                 
7 During our sample period RBS acquired part of ABN Amro; Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch; and 
Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia. We consider these merged banks as a single entity over our whole sample 
period. We add the number of loans their respective parts provided during the pre-merger period and calculate 
other bank-specific variables as weighted averages, using total assets of the pre-merger entities as weights. 
8 Note that complete information is available to construct this dependent variable. Even though we only have 
loan share information for 25 per cent of the sample, we do have the total loan volume and the names of all 
lenders in each syndicate. So the change in the number of loans of bank i to country j is measured without error. 
  10number of loans, we see that the decline was even sharper than in terms of loan volume, 
indicating that in particular smaller loans were discontinued during the crisis. 
Unit Obs Mean Median St Dev Min Max
Dependent variables
Change in cross-border lending (volume) % 2,082 -64 -96 60 -100 237
Change in cross-border lending to advanced countries (volume) % 975 -60 -83 58 -100 237
Change in cross-border lending to emerging markets (volume) % 1,107 -68 -100 62 -100 234
Sudden stop Dummy 2,146 0.62 1 0.49 0 1
Sudden stop to advanced countries Dummy 1,005 0.54 1 0.50 0 1
Sudden stop to emerging markets Dummy 1,141 0.68 1 0.47 0 1
Change in cross-border lending (numbers) % 2,100 -89 -97 15 -100 -33
Change in cross-border lending to advanced countries (numbers) % 980 -87 -91 15 -100 -33
Change in cross-border lending to emerging markets (numbers) % 1,120 -92 -100 14 -100 -33
Information variables
Distance Km 2,146 4,772 3,604 3,764 102 14,966
Subsidiary Dummy 2,146 0.16 0 0 . 3 701
Domestic lenders % 2,146 34 30 25 0 100
Experience No. loans 2,146 34 10 123 0 2,242
Control variables
Exposure % 2,150 0.45 0.10 2.26 0 90.64
State support Dummy 2,150 0.47 0 0.50 0 1
Bank size (2006) USD billion 2,125 780 555 723 2 3,011
Bank solvency (2006) % 2,125 5.58 5.26 2.67 1.56 18.55
Change in bank solvency (2006-2009) % points 2,125 0.37 0.28 1.17 -2.87 3.68
Bank liquidity (2006) % 2,125 54 37 51 2 376
Change in bank liquidity (2006-2009) % points 2,125 -7.54 -4.81 23.36 -70.36 114.95
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
The table shows summary statistics for our main variables. Table A3 in the Appendix contains information on all variable definitions, the units and
period of measurement, and the data sources.
 
 
We create a number of variables that measure for individual bank-country combinations the 
ability of banks to mitigate the increase in information costs during the crisis (‘Information 
variables’ in Table 1). We start with using the great circle distance formula to calculate the 
geographical distance between each bank’s headquarters and its various countries of 
operations as the number of kilometres between the capitals of both countries. The average 
distance to a foreign borrower is 4,772 km, but there exists considerable variation (the 
standard deviation is 3,764 km). 
Second, we link each of our banks to Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database, which not only 
contains information on balance sheets and income statements but also on ownership 
structure (both of the banks themselves and their minority and majority equity participations). 
For each bank we identify all majority-owned foreign bank subsidiaries. We create a dummy 
variable Subsidiary that is one in each country where a particular bank owns a subsidiary. A 
  11typical bank owns a subsidiary in three foreign countries and this means that in about 16 per 
cent of our bank-country pairs a subsidiary is present. 
Third, we count for each bank in each of its countries of operations the number of different 
domestic banks with which it has cooperated in a syndicate since 2000. We divide this 
number by the total number of domestic banks that are active in a particular destination 
country to create the variable Domestic lenders. A better embedding in a network of local 
banks may allow a bank to become less of an ‘outsider’ and to ‘free-ride’ on the ability of 
local banks to generate information about local borrowers. On average a bank has worked 
with 15 different domestic banks in a given country, which is 34 per cent of the average 
number of domestic lenders. Variation is large, however, with some international banks never 
cooperating with domestic banks, whereas others have cooperated at least once with each 
domestic bank. 
Fourth, we create a variable that measures a bank’s prior experience in syndicated bank 
lending to a specific country. We measure Experience as the number of loans that a bank 
provided to a particular country since 2000 and that had matured by August 2007 (we 
exclude still outstanding loans as these are included in the separate variable Exposure). The 
average number of prior loans is 34 and ranges between 0 and 2,242. 
In addition, we create a number of control variables. The first one is Exposure, which 
measures for each bank-country combination the amount of outstanding syndicated debt as a 
percentage of the bank’s total assets at the time of the Lehman collapse. On average this 
outstanding exposure was close to 0.5 per cent of the parent bank’s balance sheet. We are 
agnostic about the impact of this variable on the severity of the lending decline. Banks may 
have adjusted their lending the most to countries where they had relatively high pre-crisis 
exposures, for instance because risk limits became more binding for such countries. On the 
other hand, banks may have mainly retrenched from ‘marginal’, non-core countries while 
staying put in their core markets (as defined by the pre-crisis portfolio share). 
The other control variables are bank-specific and do not vary across destination countries. We 
only include these in regression specifications without bank fixed effects, in order to learn 
more about what type of banks reduced their international bank lending the most. We use two 
variables that control for the pre-crisis (2006) financial strength of each bank. These are 
Solvency (equity/total assets) and Liquidity (Liquid assets/deposits and other short-term 
funding). Controlling for banks’ pre-crisis financial strength is important as banks with weak 
  12balance sheets can be expected to reduce foreign exposures the most (McGuire and Tarashev, 
2008; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010). We also include these variables as changes over the 
2006-2009 period to take into account that banks not only differed in terms of initial 
conditions but also in terms of how hard they were hit by the financial crisis. Banks differed 
in particular with regard to their dependence on short-term US dollar liquidity to fund foreign 
US dollar claims (McGuire and Von Peter, 2009). 
Finally, we include a dummy variable State support that indicates whether a bank received 
government support during the crisis. To create this dummy, we develop a database of all 
financial support measures – capital injections, loan guarantees, and removals of toxic assets 
– since the onset of the crisis. Thirty per cent of the banks in our sample received some form 
of official government support and this translates into 47 per cent of the bank-country pairs. 
State support can be seen as an indicator of a bank’s financial fragility during the crisis and 
thus as a proxy for the bank’s need to deleverage – including through reducing cross-border 
lending. In addition, Kamil and Rai (2010) suggest that public rescue programmes may also 
have  caused banks to ‘accelerate the curtailment of cross-border bank flows’. Anecdotal 
evidence indeed suggests that rescue packages came with strings attached as banks were 
asked to refocus on domestic lending. For instance, when the UK government decided to 
guarantee a substantial part of Royal Bank of Scotland’s assets, the bank “promised to lend £ 
50 billion more in the next two years, expanding its domestic loan book by a fifth (The 
Economist, 28 February 2009, p. 37, italics added). Likewise, French banks that received 
state support had to increase domestic lending by 3-4 per cent annually, while Dutch bank 
ING announced that it would lend US$ 32 billion to Dutch borrowers in return for 
government assistance (World Bank, 2009, p. 70). 
3.2. Econometric methodology 
To examine whether increased information costs and banks’ ability to mitigate such costs 
impact the cross-border transmission of a financial shock, we use the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers as an exogenous event that triggered a sudden stop in cross-border lending. By 
comparing the average monthly lending volume (or number of loans) after the Lehman 
collapse to average monthly lending before the start of the crisis, we control for all time-
invariant characteristics of recipient countries that influence the level of cross-border lending 
(such as the institutional environment and the level of economic development), plus all time-
invariant factors that affect the lending volume of bank i to country j. This allows us to focus 
  13on testing for heterogeneous bank behaviour as a result of differences in how banks deal with 
information asymmetries vis-à-vis foreign borrowers. Collapsing the monthly time-series 
information on lending into pre-crisis and post-Lehman averages also prevents inconsistent 
standard errors due to auto-correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). 
We use country-fixed effects to focus on differences across banks within countries. A key 
advantage of this approach is that it allows us to neatly control for changes in credit demand 
at the country level. In particular, we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Schnabl (2011) 
who control for credit demand at the firm level by using firm-fixed effects in regressions on a 
dataset of firms that borrow from multiple banks. Since our dataset contains information on 
multiple banks lending to the same country, we can use country fixed effects to rigorously 
control for credit demand at the host country level (cf. Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011). This is 
important because the crisis hit the real economy of countries to a different extent and with a 
different lag. Firms’ demand for external funds to finance working capital and investments 
has consequently been affected to varying degrees. Summarising, our model specification is: 
 
ij j i ij ij X I L           
' '
     (1) 
 
where subscripts i and j denote individual banks and destination countries, respectively, β’ 
and γ’ are coefficient vectors, Iij is a matrix of information variables for individual bank-
destination country pairs, Xi is a matrix of bank-specific control variables, φ is a vector of 
country-fixed effect coefficients, and η is the error term.  ij L   is one of our three dependent 
variables:  Volume (the percentage change in the average monthly cross-border lending 
volume by bank i to country j in the post-Lehman compared to the pre-crisis period), 
Numbers (the percentage change in the average monthly number of cross-border loans by 
bank i to country j in the post-Lehman compared to the pre-crisis period), or Sudden stop (a 
dummy that is 1 for each bank-country combination where the decline in bank lending during 
the crisis exceeded 75 per cent). 
We also estimate regressions in which we substitute the bank-specific control variables for 
bank-fixed effects. Since banks are active in multiple countries, we can use bank-fixed effects 
in addition to the country-fixed effects which allows for the most rigorous testing of the 
bank-country pair information variables. These regressions thus take the following form: 
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'       ( 2 )  
 
where ε is a vector of bank-fixed effects. We estimate all our models using OLS except for 
the Sudden stop regressions where we use a logit model. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered by bank. 
  154. Empirical results 
4.1. Baseline regression results 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results from our baseline regressions. Table 2 first shows 
regressions based on the full dataset for our three dependent variables: Volume, Sudden stop, 
and Numbers. These regressions include either bank-specific controls or bank-fixed effects. 
For reasons of brevity we do not show the control variables for the last two dependent 
variables (the statistical and economic significance of the related coefficients is very similar 
to those reported for Volume). In Table 3 we then split the sample into lending to advanced 
countries and emerging markets. Here, we only present the results of our bank-fixed effects’ 
regressions. We explain between 20 and 30 per cent of the variation in banks’ post-Lehman 
retrenchment from specific countries. 
It appears that cross-border lending to countries in which a bank owns a Subsidiary is more 
stable. The first two columns of Table 2 show that lending to countries with a Subsidiary was 
reduced significantly less, in terms of volume and number of loans. The probability of a very 
sharp decline –a Sudden stop of 75 per cent or more– is also significantly lower. However, 
when we add other explanatory variables to the combined regressions on the right-hand side, 
it turns out that the Subsidiary effect is dominated by these other variables. Table 3 shows 
that the Subsidiary effect is more robust in emerging markets, arguably because in these 
countries trustworthy ‘hard’ information is less readily available and a local presence may be 
more important. On average banks reduced the amount of lending and the number of loans to 
an emerging market with a subsidiary by 12 and 4 percentage points less, respectively, 
compared to an emerging market without a subsidiary (based on the combined bank-fixed 
effects’ regressions in the lower panel of Table 3). 
  16Subsidiary 0.122*** 0.117** 0.066 0.056
[0.006] [0.013] [0.131] [0.210]
Distance -0.043** -0.073*** -0.016 -0.048**
[0.021] [0.000] [0.376] [0.016]
Domestic lenders 0.362*** 0.369*** 0.281*** 0.264***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Experience 0.051*** 0.059*** 0.011 0.014
[0.000] [0.000] [0.466] [0.379]
Exposure 0.025 -0.449 0.006 -1.153 -0.243 -1.541 -0.255 -1.771 -0.342 -2.771**
[0.902] [0.707] [0.978] [0.371] [0.272] [0.237] [0.231] [0.199] [0.185] [0.048]
State support -0.078** -0.085** -0.088** -0.088** -0.091**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.011] [0.013] [0.010]
Bank size 0.058*** 0.073*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.049***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Solvency 1.407** 1.632** 1.173* 1.195* 1.274*
[0.028] [0.016] [0.065] [0.061] [0.063]
Solvency change -0.602 -0.412 -0.942 -0.541 -0.935
[0.658] [0.774] [0.521] [0.705] [0.527]
Liquidity 0.015 0.018 0.031 0.026 0.032
[0.647] [0.611] [0.328] [0.409] [0.312]
Liquidity change -0.223*** -0.199*** -0.211*** -0.208*** -0.191***
[0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004]
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,057 2,082 2,057 2,082 2,031 2,056 2,057 2,082 2,031 2,056
R-squared 0.204 0.266 0.203 0.27 0.212 0.275 0.206 0.268 0.215 0.28
Subsidiary -0.138*** -0.146*** -0.040 -0.053
[0.000] [0.000] [0.309] [0.226]
Distance 0.084*** 0.110*** 0.047** 0.072***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.002]
Domestic lenders -0.570*** -0.588*** -0.371*** -0.360***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Experience -0.096*** -0.117*** -0.041** -0.054**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.027] [0.018]
Observations 2,026 1,960 2,026 1,960 1,998 1,934 2,026 1,960 1,998 1,934
Pseudo R-squared 0.168 0.226 0.176 0.235 0.188 0.244 0.181 0.238 0.196 0.255
Subsidiary 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.024***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.007]
Distance -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.006 -0.010**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.131] [0.030]
Domestic lenders 0.090*** 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.056***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003]
Experience 0.011*** 0.012*** -0.001 0.001
[0.003] [0.006] [0.787] [0.822]
Observations 2,075 2,100 2,075 2,100 2,047 2,072 2,075 2,100 2,047 2,072




Information and crisis transmission - Baseline results
Sudden stop
This table shows estimations to explain the decline in cross-border lending from bank i to destination country j after the Lehman
Brothers default. Table A3 in the Appendix contains definitions of all variables. Regressions include either bank-specific control
variables or fixed effects (for reasons of brevity the bank controls are not shown in the Sudden stop and Numbers regressions). All
specifications include destination country fixed effects. We use an OLS (Volume and Numbers regressions) or a logit (Sudden stop) 
model. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank. Coefficients are marginal effects. Robust p-values appear in
brackets and ***, **, * correspond to the one, five and ten per cent level of significance, respectively.
 
  17Subsidiary 0.037 -0.015 -0.179** -0.101 0.028**
[0.603] [0.839] [0.013] [0.183] [0.043]
Distance -0.086*** -0.062** 0.140*** 0.086** -0.019**
[0.003] [0.043] [0.000] [0.026] [0.016]
Domestic lenders 0.442*** 0.302* -0.939*** -0.650*** 0.104***
[0.002] [0.078] [0.000] [0.007] [0.005]
Experience 0.055** 0.012 -0.120*** -0.032 0.012**
[0.018] [0.667] [0.000] [0.420] [0.041]
Exposure 1.594 0.503 0.136 0.100 -0.58 -8.894 -6.851 -4.407 -3.922 -1.877 0.357 0.234 0.136 0.140
[0.337] [0.789] [0.942] [0.957] [0.761] [0.120] [0.175] [0.284] [0.400] [0.625] [0.339] [0.523] [0.718] [0.712]
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 975 975 975 975 975 934 934 934 934 934 980 980 980 980
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.339 0.348 0.348 0.343 0.353 0.281 0.291 0.299 0.287 0.307 0.396 0.399 0.400 0.396
Subsidiary 0.181*** 0.117* -0.130** -0.029 0.046***
[0.010] [0.084] [0.025] [0.643] [0.001]
Distance -0.090** -0.063* 0.129*** 0.100*** -0.017**
[0.011] [0.067] [0.000] [0.004] [0.023]
Domestic lenders 0.326*** 0.199** -0.457*** -0.260** 0.069***
[0.002] [0.040] [0.000] [0.021] [0.005]
Experience 0.072** 0.028 -0.130*** -0.077** 0.011
[0.018] [0.280] [0.000] [0.038] [0.121]
Exposure -2.746 -3.697** -4.007** -3.419* -5.416*** 2.804 6.308 7.395 7.502 15.314* -0.453 -0.585 -0.680* -0.484
[0.118] [0.036] [0.024] [0.059] [0.003] [0.541] [0.369] [0.335] [0.286] [0.087] [0.206] [0.134] [0.074] [0.208]
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,107 1,107 1,081 1,107 1,081 926 926 902 926 902 1,120 1,120 1,092 1,120
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.288 0.288 0.294 0.287 0.302 0.196 0.207 0.213 0.210 0.229 0.330 0.325 0.337 0.323
Information and crisis transmission - Advanced countries versus emerging markets
Table 3
Volumes Sudden stop Numbers
Advanced countries
Volumes Sudden stop Numbers
Emerging markets
This table shows estimations to explain the decline in cross-border lending from bank i to destination country j after the Lehman Brothers default. Table A3 in the Appendix contains definitio
variables. Emerging markets are all countries except high-income OECD countries. Although Slovenia and South-Korea were recently reclassified as high-income countries we still consider
emerging markets. All regressions include bank fixed effects and destination country fixed effects. We use an OLS (Volume and Numbers regressions) or a logit (Sudden stop)m o d e l .S t a n d a r de
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank. Coefficients are marginal effects. Robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, **, * correspond to the one, five and ten percent level of sign
respectively.
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ented in earlier studies, but also on its stability. Banks reduced the volume
 a mean distance by 28 per cent more compared to borrowers
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 lending stability. A one standard deviation increase in Distance leads to an additional 
e of 35 per cent, whereas a one standard deviation decline in 
 leads to a volume decrease of only 4 per cent (all else equal). 
s that international banks that regularly 
Domestic banks are significantly more stable sources of cross-border credit.
th advanced countries and to emerging markets we find that 
to domestic banks outperform less-connected 
rms of lending stability. Our full sample results indicate that banks reduce their 
where their level of cooperation with Domestic banks
ean level across our sample, compared to countries where they had not 
estic banks before the outbreak of the crisis. 
Experience with cross-border syndicated lending to a 
nding stability as well. Banks reduce their 
e with 21 per cent less to countries in which they have average experience, 
pared to countries where their experience is very limited. This effect, however, is less 
pact of either cooperation with Domestic banks or Distance when looking 
es or in the number of loans. Just like the Subsidiary effect, the 
 effect is stronger in emerging markets, where it has a robustly negative impact on 
 
9 In an unreported regression, we also interact Distance and Subsidiary. Distance may not only have a direct 
negative effect on lending stability but also reduce the positive effect of the presence of a Subsidiary because 
intra-bank agency costs increase with distance (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales., 2000). Indeed, we find that in 
emerging markets, setting up a subsidiary is an effective tool to reduce distance-related agency costs although its 
effectiveness decreases with distance. the probability of a sudden stop in lending. Banks that had built up a track record of 
syndicated lending over time turned out to be less fickle during the crisis. 
Finally, our control variables tell some interesting stories as well (top panel Table 2). We find 
quite strong evidence for a negative correlation between state support and cross-border 
lending during the crisis, in line with an increased focus on domestic lending by supported 
banks. Government-supported banks reduced their cross-border lending by 9 per cent more 
than non-supported banks. The result holds when we include a battery of other bank-specific 
control variables. While this seems to confirm the anecdotal evidence on a negative causal 
impact of financial protectionism on cross-border lending, it may also partly reflect selection 
bias. Weaker banks, with the most binding balance sheet constraints and the biggest need to 
deleverage, were also those most in need of government support. As expected, we also find 
that larger and better capitalized banks were relatively stable sources of credit during the 
crisis, whereas banks that had to increase their liquidity during the crisis were among those 
that retrenched the most from foreign markets. 
4.2. Robustness 
Alternative calculations of dependent variables 
Table 4 presents a number of robustness tests to check whether our main results are sensitive 
to changes in the way we calculate our three dependent variables Volume, Sudden stop, and 
Numbers. For ease of comparison, the ‘Base’ column replicates the baseline results as 
reported in Table 2 for each of these variables. First, the ‘Cut-off 99 pct’ columns show 
regressions where we define and remove outliers in the dependent variable that are above the 
99
th percentile (so far we have excluded observations above the 97
th percentile).
10 Changing 
this cut-off does not materially affect our results. 
Next, the ‘1-year change’ columns show regressions where we define the decline in cross-
border lending by comparing the volume (or number) of loans over the 12-month period of 
October 2008-September 2009 to the volume (or number) of loans over the 12-month period 
of August 2006-July 2007. This differs from our baseline definition where we compare 
average monthly lending volumes (numbers) over the post-Lehman period with average 
monthly lending volumes (numbers) over a longer pre-crisis period: January 2005-July 2007. 
For the Sudden stop variable the ‘1 year change’ regression means that the dummy becomes 
                                                 
10 This robustness test is not applicable to the Sudden stop regressions. 
  20one when the decline in the 1-year lending volume is more than 75 per cent. Our results again 
remain virtually unchanged. 
For the Sudden stop variable we also run regressions where we define a Sudden stop as a 
complete stop in lending, i.e. zero loans in the post-Lehman period (‘Extensive margin’ 
column). Table 4 shows that our results are robust to this change. 
Finally, we recalculate the dependent variables that measure changes in loan volumes 
(Volume and Sudden stop) on the basis of three different loan allocation rules. As mentioned 
in Section 3.1, Loan Analytics only provides information on the exact loan breakdown for 
about 25 per cent of all loans. So far we have used a rather simple rule to distribute the other 
75 per cent of the loans over their respective syndicate members: we assumed that each 
lender provided the same amount of money. To minimize the risk that we introduce a 
significant measurement error by choosing a particular distribution rule, we recalculate our 
dependent variable using three alternative methods.
11 
The ‘Alternative rule’ columns show regressions where the dependent variable is calculated 
on the basis of a different rule. The information from Loan Analytics shows that about 50 per 
cent of a typical loan is distributed to participants (junior banks), whereas the other half is 
retained by loan arrangers (senior banks). We therefore allocate half of each loan to the 
arrangers and half to the participants and further subdivide these loan portions within the 
arranger and participant groups on an equal basis. This alternative calculation leaves our main 
results unchanged. 
Next, we go one step further and use the 25 per cent of our sample for which we have full 
information to estimate a model in which the loan amount of individual lenders is the 
dependent variable. As explanatory variables we use the average loan amount (total loan 
amount divided by the number of lenders in the syndicate), a dummy that indicates whether a 
lender is an arranger or a participant, an interaction term between this arranger dummy and a 
variable that measures whether the borrower is a repeat borrower or not, an interaction term 
between the arranger dummy and a post-Lehman time dummy, and a set of bank and country 
dummies. 
 
                                                 
11 Simply using the 25 per cent of the loan population for which we have breakdown information would 
introduce a measurement error in the dependent variables Volume and Sudden stop. When constructing the 
lending flows from bank i to country j we would need to assume that the loan amount is zero for the loan shares 
that are missing, which obviously is incorrect. Because the availability of loan allocation information is more or 
less random, this problem would extend to all bank-country pairs. 




















Subsidiary 0.056 0.095* 0.098** 0.071 0.049 0.040 -0.053 -0.033 -0.079 -0.068 -0.078* -0.048 0.024*** 0.037*** 0.054**
[0.210] [0.099] [0.044] [0.155] [0.320] [0.416] [0.226] [0.453] [0.116] [0.116] [0.056] [0.269] [0.007] [0.002] [0.028]
Distance -0.048** -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.060*** -0.047** -0.104*** 0.072*** 0.053** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.059*** -0.010** -0.011** -0.025
[0.016] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.022] [0.000] [0.002] [0.017] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.030] [0.043] [0.113]
Domestic banks 0.264*** 0.274** 0.228** 0.310*** 0.251*** 0.077 -0.360*** -0.357*** -0.242** -0.342*** -0.368*** -0.226** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.147**
[0.002] [0.018] [0.013] [0.001] [0.008] [0.499] [0.000] [0.000] [0.031] [0.002] [0.000] [0.024] [0.003] [0.010] [0.019]
Experience 0.014 -0.006 0.011 -0.007 0.01 0.022 -0.054** -0.070*** -0.143*** -0.057** -0.055** -0.03 0.001 -0.001 0.015
[0.379] [0.810] [0.655] [0.727] [0.588] [0.311] [0.018] [0.005] [0.000] [0.014] [0.015] [0.120] [0.822] [0.822] [0.316]
Exposure -2.771** -3.893** -5.749*** -3.725** -2.527* -2.320* 0.447 3.690* 1.812 0.992 0.873 -1.33 -0.289 -0.29 -1.700*
[0.048] [0.017] [0.002] [0.012] [0.078] [0.096] [0.835] [0.084] [0.389] [0.629] [0.700] [0.333] [0.279] [0.422] [0.051]
Observations 2,056 2,097 1,896 2,054 2,052 2,056 1,934 1,809 2,077 1,921 1,924 1,913 2,072 2,099 1,915
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.280 0.245 0.257 0.256 0.265 0.201 0.255 0.260 0.287 0.260 0.258 0.232 0.359 0.334 0.318
Table 4
Information and crisis transmission - Robustness checks
Volume Sudden stop Numbers
This table shows the results of various robustness tests for our baseline regressions to explain the decline in cross-border lending from bank i to destination country j after the Lehman Brothers default. Table A3 in the Appendix
contains definitions of all variables. The 'Base' columns replicate the baseline results from Table 2. The 'Cut-off 99 pct' columns show regressions where we exclude outliers above the 99th instead of the 97th percentile of the
dependent variable. The '1 year change' columns show regressions where we compare the 12 months after the Lehman collapse with the 12 month pre-crisis period July 2006-August 2007. The 'Alternative rule' columns show
regressions where the dependent variable is calculated on the basis of a rule where half of the loan is allocated to MLAs and half to the participants. Within each of these two lender groups the loan is divided equally. The 'Model'
columns show regressions where the allocation of the loans over the syndicate members is based on predicted values from a regression model. The 'Extreme distribution' columns show regressions where the dependent variable is
based on an allocation rule where one randomly chosen lender receives (almost) all of the loan whereas the other lenders receive only 1 per cent of the total loan amount each. The 'Extensive margin' column shows regressions
where the sudden stop is defined as a complete stop in lending (zero loans in the post-Lehman period). All regressions include bank fixed effects and destination country fixed effects. We use an OLS (Volume and Numbers 
regressions) or a logit (Sudden stop) model. Coefficients are marginal effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank. Robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, **, * correspond to the one, five and
ten percent level of significance, respectively.
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To look into the relative importance of geographical, cultural, and institutional distance in 
more detail, we analyse the impact of a number of non-geographical distance measures on 
lending stability. These include a dummy variable that indicates whether the bank’s home 
country and the destination country share a common language, a dummy that indicates 
whether both countries share colonial links, a variable that measures the absolute difference 
between both countries in the Doing Business credit information index (which measures rules 
affecting the scope, access and quality of credit information), and a dummy that indicates 
whether the origin of the legal system of both countries differs. 
Distance 0.053** 0.046** 0.054** 0.055** 0.051**
[0.017] [0.044] [0.016] [0.012] [0.024]
Common language -0.128** -0.102*
[0.026] [0.077]
Colonial links -0.050 -0.056
[0.498] [0.443]
Credit info -0.021 -0.024
[0.297] [0.212]
Legal difference 0.065* 0.058
[0.067] [0.105]
Subsidiary -0.033 -0.035 -0.028 -0.043 -0.033 -0.046 -0.036 -0.039 -0.030
[0.453] [0.431] [0.533] [0.322] [0.455] [0.294] [0.417] [0.374] [0.500]
Domestic banks -0.357*** -0.383*** -0.359*** -0.381*** -0.350*** -0.382*** -0.351*** -0.374*** -0.348***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Experience -0.070*** -0.082*** -0.071*** -0.083*** -0.070*** -0.085*** -0.072*** -0.082*** -0.070***
[0.005] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.006]
Exposure 3.690* 3.727* 3.953* 3.309 3.684* 3.125 3.474 3.593* 3.910*
[0.084] [0.082] [0.067] [0.119] [0.084] [0.144] [0.106] [0.089] [0.066]
Observations 1,809 1,809 1,809 1,809 1,809 1,809 1,809 1,809 1,809
P s e u d o  R - s q u a r e d 0 . 2 60 . 2 60 . 2 60 . 2 60 . 2 60 . 2 60 . 2 60 . 2 60 . 2 6
Table 5
Distance and crisis transmission
All countries
This table shows estimations to explain, using different distance measures, the decline in cross-border lending from bank i 
to destination country j after the Lehman Brothers default. The dependent variable is Sudden stop.T a b l eA 3i nt h e
Appendix contains definitions of all variables. Regressions include bank-fixed effects and destination country-fixed effects.
We use a logit model with standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank. Coefficients are marginal




In Table 5 we add these alternative distance measures one-by-one to our baseline regression; 
in each case first alone, and then together, with our geographical distance measure to see how 
they affect the coefficient of the latter. We only show the regressions for the dependent 
  24variable Sudden stop. Results for Amount and Numbers are very similar and available upon 
request. It becomes clear that geographical distance is a very robust determinant of lending 
stability. The variable is only ‘challenged’ by the dummy that measures whether the bank’s 
home country and the destination country share a common language. This cultural proxy has 
a significant negative effect on the probability of a Sudden stop: lending flows between 
culturally similar countries are more resilient. However, even when we add this variable 
together with Distance, the coefficient of the latter stays statistically highly significant and 
displays only a marginal reduction in economic significance. 
Finally, the institutional distance variables Colonial links, Credit info and Legal difference do 
not have a strong independent impact on lending stability and hardly affect the coefficient of 
Distance in a bilateral ‘horse race’. Note that the coefficient for Legal difference is significant 
at the 10 per cent level and has the right sign: the probability of a Sudden stop in lending is 
higher in case the bank’s home country and the destination country have different legal 
origins. In summary, we conclude that geographical distance is what matters for lending 
stability: during a crisis banks continue to lend more to borrowers that are physically closer. 
4.3. Extensions 
Borrower heterogeneity 
The extent to which banks reduced their cross-border lending during the crisis may not only 
have differed across destination countries, but also across borrower groups within these 
countries. In this sub-section we first analyse whether there has been a differentiated crisis 
impact on cross-border lending to first-time borrowers and to repeat borrowers. We define 
first-time borrowers as borrowers that had never borrowed from bank i before the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, whereas repeat borrowers are borrowers to whom bank i had lent at least 
once. Successful prior loans and the associated borrower reputation can attenuate information 
asymmetries between lenders and their borrower (Diamond, 1991 and Gorton and Pennachi, 
1995). De Haas and Van Horen (2010) find that arrangers of syndicated loans need to retain 
less in the case of loans to repeat borrowers and that retention rates for loans to such 
borrowers needed to increase less during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. If loans to repeat 
borrowers are plagued by fewer agency problems, we expect that the information variables 
we use in our analysis will have less of an impact on the reduction in cross-border lending to 
such borrowers. 
  25X→ Subsidiary Distance Dom. 
lenders
Experience X→ Subsidiary Distance Dom. 
lenders
Experience
X -0.084** 0.097*** -0.498*** -0.106*** X 0.139* 0.024 -0.121 -0.021
[0.027] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.060] [0.541] [0.354] [0.437]
X*First-time 0.002 0.001 0.079 -0.043** X*Non-bank 0.294*** 0.065** -0.342*** -0.066***
[0.958] [0.969] [0.404] [0.022] [0.002] [0.040] [0.010] [0.003]
First-time 0.152*** 0.150 0.128*** 0.297*** Non-bank -0.298*** -0.581*** -0.263*** -0.190***
[0.000] [0.302] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.009]
Exposure -3.622* -2.263 -1.446 0.616 Exposure -2.629* -1.033 -0.644 -0.349
[0.087] [0.218] [0.399] [0.702] [0.065] [0.486] [0.629] [0.837]
Observations 2,681 2,681 2,659 2,681 Observations 2,213 2,213 2,190 2,213
Pseudo R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 Pseudo R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26
Table 6
Crisis transmission and borrower heterogeneity
All countries
Repeat vs first-time borrowers Bank vs non-bank borrowers
This table summarizes estimations to assess whether the determinants of cross-border lending stability after the Lehman Brothers default
differ for lending to repeat versus first-time borrowers and for lending to banks versus non-bank borrowers. The dependent variable is Sudden 
stop. Table A3 in the Appendix contains definitions of all variables. The first set of regressions is estimated on the basis of a dataset that
contains two observations for each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a
sudden stop in lending from bank i to first-time borrowers in country j and one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates
whether there was a sudden stop in lending from bank i to repeat borrowers in country j. First-time borrowers are borrowers that had never
borrowed from bank i before the collapse of Lehman Brothers whereas repeat borrowers are borrowers to whom bank i had lent at least once.
The second set of regressions is also estimated on the basis of a dataset that contains two observations for each bank i-country j pair: one
where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a sudden stop in lending from bank i to banks in country j and one
where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a sudden stop in lending from bank i to non-bank borrowers in
country j. The interaction variables interact the main independent variables with the dummy that identifies first-time borrowers (first set of
regressions) or non-bank borrowers (second set). All regressions include country fixed effects and bank fixed effects that are allowed to vary
between repeat vs. first-time borrowers and between bank vs. non-bank borrowers, respectively. We use a logit model where standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank. Coefficients are marginal effects. Robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, **, *
correspond to the one, five and ten percent level of significance, respectively.
 
The left-hand side of Table 6 shows estimation results for a regression model that allows for a 
differential impact of our information variables on repeat and first-time borrowers. As in 
Table 5 the dependent variable is Sudden stop.
12 The regressions are estimated on the basis of 
a dataset that contains two observations for each bank i-country  j pair: one where the 
dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a Sudden stop in lending 
from bank i to first-time borrowers in country j, and one where the dependent variable is a 
dummy that indicates whether there was a Sudden stop in lending from bank i to repeat 
borrowers in country j. The interaction terms interact the main independent variables with the 
dummy that identifies first-time borrowers. 
The first line confirms our earlier results: the probability of a Sudden stop is lower in case a 
bank has a subsidiary in a country, is geographically closer to the country, is well-integrated 
into a network of domestic borrowers and has previous experience in the country. The second 
line indicates that these effects are similar for first-time and repeat borrowers with the 
exception of Experience, which is particularly important for lending to first-time borrowers. 
                                                 
12 The results are again similar when using the other two dependent variables (results available upon request). 
  26Finally, the third line shows that, as expected, the probability of a Sudden stop was 
significantly higher for lending flows to first-time borrowers (all else equal).
13 
The right-hand side of Table 6 shows similar regressions for cross-border lending flows to 
bank versus non-bank borrowers. Also in this case the dataset contains two observations for 
each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates 
whether there was a Sudden stop in lending from bank i to banks in country j, and one where 
the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a Sudden stop in lending 
from bank i to non-bank borrowers in country j.
14 The interaction terms interact the main 
independent variables with the dummy that identifies non-bank borrowers. 
Compared to other sectors, banks are intrinsically difficult to screen and monitor since they 
themselves are delegated monitors of a portfolio of sub-projects (Diamond, 1984). Agency 
problems in inter-bank lending are difficult to resolve as there is not one (physical) project or 
factory that a potential lender can visit and inspect. Due diligence of a bank borrower is a 
more onerous process that deals with assessing the bank’s risk and operational systems as 
well as the quality of a sample of the loan book. Banks’ high leverage exacerbates these 
agency problems (Morgan, 2002). During the crisis short-term inter-bank lending virtually 
dried up in many countries and the extreme rise in uncertainty and information asymmetries 
in lending between banks also had repercussions for longer-term lending between banks.  
The results in Table 6 indicate that none of the mechanisms that banks successfully used to 
limit information costs during the crisis – country-specific experience, relationships with 
domestic co-lenders, and (to a lesser extent) a local subsidiary – helped to contain the crunch 
in inter-bank cross-border syndicated bank lending. Agency problems and mistrust in the 
inter-bank market were simply too large for banks to mitigate them in any meaningful way. 
The third line shows that the probability of a Sudden stop in cross-border lending was, as 




                                                 
13 The finding that access to borrower information is important for both lending to first-time and to repeat 
borrowers shows that our baseline results do not merely reflect a crisis-related shift to repeat borrowers (who are 
likely to be concentrated in countries where a bank owns a subsidiary, that are close, and where the bank has 
cooperated with domestic banks and has built up lending experience more generally). 
14 Because not all banks lend to both groups in each country in the pre-crisis period, the number of observations 
in this regression is less than twice the number of observations in the baseline regression in Table 2. 
  27Arrangers versus participants 
A typical syndicate consists of two tiers: arrangers and participants. The arrangers comprise 
the senior tier and negotiate the lending terms with the borrower, who gives the arrangers a 
mandate to structure and market the loan. Arrangers then allocate a substantial part of the 
loan to a junior tier, the participants, who assume a more passive role. Participants are usually 
not actively involved in the organisation of the loan or in the screening and monitoring of the 
borrower. Mechanisms to deal with information problems may therefore have been 
particularly important for arrangers and our results may consequently be driven by banks that 
typically act in an arranger role. 
To see whether this is the case, we rerun our baseline regressions while including a variable 
Arranger that measures for each bank the percentage of pre-crisis loans in which it acted as a 
mandated lead arranger or book runner, rather than as a participant. We interact our main 
information variables – Distance,  Subsidiary,  Domestic  banks, and Experience – with 
Arranger. We find no significant differences between both tiers of syndicate members. This 
suggests that even for banks that more or less passively buy into a syndicated loan, it matters 
whether it has lending experience in a country, whether the country is distant or not, whether 
it has been lending together with domestic banks, and whether – in the case of emerging 
markets – it owns a subsidiary in that country. 
Impact on loan maturity and spreads 
The sudden stop in cross-border bank lending may not only have manifested itself in a 
reduced availability of credit, but also in higher lending rates and/or a reduction in maturities 
for those loans that did go ahead. Lending rates may have gone up especially where banks 
found it difficult to assess the increase in risks in the wake of the Lehman Brothers collapse.
15 
Likewise, banks may have shortened maturities in particular in countries where they 
experienced more difficulties in stepping up their screening efforts. Theory suggests that 
lending at short maturities may reduce moral hazard and other debt-related agency problems 
(Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980; Rey and Stiglitz, 1993). 
To look into this, we estimate regressions where our dependent variables are the change in 
the average Spread charged by bank i to borrowers in country j and the change in the average 
Maturity of loans by bank i to country j, respectively. Spread measures the spread over Libor 
                                                 
15 Lending rate increases will nevertheless be constrained by concerns about moral hazard. Note that our 
country-fixed effects control for the change in country risk, which allows us to focus on how different banks 
behave differently within a certain country. 
  28(or other relevant reference rate). We find no robust evidence of an impact of any of our 
information variables on the average change in maturity or spreads. One interesting and clear 
exception is the positive impact of Experience on spreads, both in emerging markets and 
developed countries (significant at the 5 per cent level in both sub-sample regressions and at 
the 1 per cent level in a regression for all countries). Banks with more lending experience in a 
country are more inclined to continue to lend but this commitment – and the reduction in 
competitive pressures due to other lenders leaving the market – comes at the cost of higher 
lending rates. 
Cross-border versus domestic syndicated lending 
Because international banks were more inclined to keep lending to some countries than to 
others, we document substantial variation in the severity of the sudden stop after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers (Figure 1). While a full analysis of the impact of the sudden stop on 
destination countries is beyond the scope of this paper, Figure 2 illustrates that most countries 
were unable to offset the decline in cross-border lending through increasing domestic 
syndicated lending. 
Figure 2 
A comparison of cross-border and total syndicated lending
This figure compares the change in cross-border syndicated lending to a country (horizontal axis) with the change in total syndicated lending
(cross-border plus domestic syndicated lending) in that country. Lending change is the percentage change in average monthly lending in the post-
Lehman compared to the pre-crisis period. The pre-crisis period is defined as January 2005 to July 2007 and the post-Lehman period as October
2008 to October 2009. The left-hand pane shows all 60 destination countries included in our dataset whereas the right-hand pane zooms in on
those countries that experienced a decline in both cross-border and total syndicated lending. Countries that experienced a percentage change in
domestic lending that was exactly equal to the percentage change in cross-border lending are on the 45º line. Countries where domestic lending
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  29The left-hand pane shows that there were only a few countries – India, China, Japan – where 
increased lending by (often state-owned) banks more than compensated for the severe drop in 
cross-border inflows. The right-hand pane shows that most countries experienced a decline in 
total syndicated lending very similar to the decline in cross-border syndicated lending 
(observations on the 45º line). Domestic lending was unable to cushion much of the decline 
in credit from abroad. Only a few countries –Germany, South Africa, Taiwan – partially 
counterbalanced reduced inflows with increased domestic lending. This imperfect 
substitutability between cross-border and domestic syndicated loans implies that the results 
we document in this paper are likely to have had severe consequences for the total lending 
supply in the destination countries. 
  305. Conclusion 
We use a detailed dataset on cross-border bank lending to analyse to what extent mechanisms 
to mitigate information costs enable banks to limit their decrease in cross-border lending 
during a crisis. We employ country- and bank-fixed effects to rigorously control for changes 
in credit demand and other confounding factors, instead focusing on the impact of 
information variables on the stability of lending by specific banks to borrowers in specific 
countries. In line with our theoretical priors, we find a strong and robust negative effect of 
geographical distance on lending stability, both in lending to advanced and to emerging 
markets. Distant borrowers are not only more difficult to screen and monitor in general, but 
their creditworthiness is also particularly difficult to assess during a crisis. 
An effective way for banks to (partially) offset the impact of distance is to cooperate with 
domestic banks. We find that during the global financial crisis banks were better able to keep 
lending to countries in which they are well integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders. 
Likewise, banks also remained more committed to lend to countries in which they had gained 
experience by building relationships with (repeat) borrowers. Banks that have built up a 
track-record of syndicated lending to a particular country turn out to be less fickle during a 
crisis. Track records matter on the side of borrowers too: the sudden stop was particularly 
severe in the case of lending flows to first-time borrowers. Finally, we find that in the case of 
cross-border lending to emerging markets, where trustworthy ‘hard’ information – such as 
accounting reports – may be less readily available, the presence of a local subsidiary also 
stabilises cross-border lending. 
To sum up, our findings paint a more nuanced picture than the black-and-white dichotomy of 
transaction-based lending by large banks versus relationship lending by small banks. We 
show that even in a sample of the largest international banks that provide loans to large 
companies, access to ‘soft’ information – gathered through repeat lending and interaction 
with domestic banks – is important. 
Our results clearly bear on the policy debate on financial globalisation and in particular on 
whether and how countries should integrate their banking systems with global financial 
markets. A key feature of cross-border lending that has been a focus of debate, and further 
underlined by the recent crisis, is its unstable character (for instance compared to lending by 
domestic banks or foreign bank subsidiaries). Our results provide some first answers to the 
question of when cross-border lending is particularly volatile and when it is not. Perhaps 
somewhat controversially, we find that banks that are further away from their customers are 
  31less reliable funding sources during a crisis. Clearly, policy-makers not only need to make a 
decision on whether to open up their banking system but also to whom. 
A second finding is that international banks with a local presence on the ground may be more 
stable providers of credit. For emerging markets that are considering to open up their banking 
system this implies that stimulating banks to ‘set up shop’ may kill two birds with one stone. 
Not only do foreign bank subsidiaries provide for a relatively stable credit source themselves, 
but their presence may also stabilise the cross-border component of bank lending. Rather than 
imposing capital controls to reduce the volatility of cross-border lending, countries may thus 
contemplate allowing international banks to also set up a local affiliate. 
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Australia National Australia Bank 55 31 21,082 2,507 266 51 0.44
Australia ANZ 36 43 15,114 5,388 231 80 0.26
Australia Commonwealth Bank of Australia 33 23 10,507 2,437 141 32 0.25
Australia Westpac 30 17 10,323 1,729 125 35 0.23
Austria RZB 94 97 18,504 4,196 783 55 0.38
Austria Erste Group Bank AG 96 96 9,754 927 482 21 0.26
Austria Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank 99 100 1,089 133 48 2 0.05
Austria Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG 93 90 1,861 198 64 6 0.03
Austria BAWAGPSK 88 100 1,190 187 89 3 0.03
Bahrain Gulf International Bank BSC 97 100 5,924 75 111 1 0.14
Bahrain Arab Banking Corp - BSC 94 100 4,787 302 100 8 0.09
Belgium Fortis 85 80 77,901 8,732 1,269 149 1.53
Belgium KBC 87 85 31,153 3,786 646 62 0.62
Belgium Dexia 91 93 18,830 4,042 180 53 0.57
Canada Scotia Capital 72 68 65,979 17,694 805 200 1.26
Canada BMO Capital Markets 65 51 33,341 7,926 718 152 0.74
Canada RBC Capital Markets 63 55 38,825 9,260 376 110 0.67
Canada TD Securities Inc 51 56 18,785 8,225 312 138 0.36
Canada CIBC World Markets 44 9 13,538 615 166 19 0.25
China Bank of China Ltd 87 73 21,422 8,630 505 68 0.48
China Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 89 52 6,197 2,201 225 42 0.15
China Bank of Communications Co Ltd 88 32 3,329 512 102 18 0.09
China China Construction Bank Corp 72 33 3,577 723 159 20 0.08
China China Merchants Securities Co Ltd 90 33 3,646 431 59 16 0.06
China Agricultural Bank of China 71 9 1,574 137 69 6 0.03
China CITIC Group 68 52 1,187 578 78 14 0.02
Denmark Danske Bank 86 78 25,299 5,072 406 39 0.65
Egypt National Bank of Egypt 75 100 1,306 174 126 2 0.04
France BNP Paribas 78 85 213,787 45,450 2,359 474 5.10
France Calyon 69 76 136,839 28,928 1,681 358 2.86
France SG Corporate & Investment Banking 73 82 112,182 25,394 1,341 293 2.62
France Natixis 55 70 50,563 10,147 960 168 1.22
France Banque Federative du Credit Mutuel 46 68 18,209 5,637 269 52 0.38
France CASDEN Banque Populaire 40 16 2,415 94 64 4 0.12
Germany Deutsche Bank 91 91 252,748 36,460 1,464 290 5.44
Germany Commerzbank Group 71 72 125,951 16,476 1,792 152 3.13
Germany DZ Bank 79 59 21,911 4,762 478 59 0.50
Germany NordLB 74 67 9,852 2,028 301 32 0.17
Germany WGZ 60 7 1,333 20 146 2 0.03
Greece Alpha Bank 62 100 2,405 23 185 1 0.07
Greece National Bank of Greece 64 96 1,919 496 178 21 0.03
Hong Kong Bank of East Asia 64 73 2,104 614 131 22 0.05
Hong Kong Iyo Finance (Hong Kong) Ltd 100 100 1,044 513 197 55 0.03
India SBI Capital Markets Ltd 60 11 3,016 1,475 190 27 0.06
Volume of cross-





List of international lenders
Appendix Table A1
Share of  cross-
border in total 
lending  (percent)
This table lists all 118 banks in our sample, ordered by country of incorporation. Pre-crisis refers to the period January 2005-July 2007 and post-
Lehman to the period October 2008-October 2009. Share of cross-border in total lending measures the volume of cross-border syndicated lending
of the bank divided by the total volume of syndicated lending by that bank (in percent). Volume of cross-border lending measures the total volume
of cross-border syndicated lending by the bank in US dollar millions. Number of cross-border loans measures the number of cross-border
syndications the bank took part in. Market share measures the market share of the bank in 2006 in the global market for cross-border syndicated
lending (in percentage points).
 


















India ICICI Bank 69 67 1,954 562 91 7 0.04
Ireland Bank of Ireland 91 94 25,197 3,848 486 62 0.54
Ireland Allied Irish Banks plc 92 95 25,778 2,454 561 51 0.53
Israel Bank Hapoalim BM 100 100 3,490 48 149 2 0.09
Israel Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM 100 100 2,191 329 63 13 0.06
Israel Israel Discount Bank Ltd 100 100 1,338 403 69 13 0.04
Italy UniCredit Group 83 87 86,313 11,476 1,582 143 1.78
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo 66 74 41,266 10,448 763 102 0.93
Italy Monte dei Paschi 70 15 8,112 419 208 13 0.11
Italy Gruppo Banco Popolare di Verona e Novara 51 1 3,180 16 117 1 0.05
Japan Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 67 38 174,833 39,457 2,243 544 3.44
Japan Mizuho 52 21 100,243 14,541 1,557 167 2.33
Japan Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc 45 19 78,368 15,660 1,364 211 1.54
Japan Nomura 100 53 24,087 272 113 6 0.58
Japan Norinchukin Bank Ltd 22 5 3,012 389 64 10 0.05
Jordan Arab Bank Group 100 100 7,361 731 150 11 0.16
Luxembourg BCEE 86 17 1,750 25 86 1 0.03
Macao Tai Fung Bank Ltd 100 100 2,694 175 48 3 0.08
Malaysia Maybank Investment Bank Bhd 93 83 3,070 536 156 17 0.08
Malaysia CIMB Group 45 62 1,024 266 89 6 0.02
Netherlands ING 86 84 98,876 15,820 1,418 204 1.99
Netherlands Rabobank 78 75 33,342 6,723 659 132 0.73
Netherlands NIBC Bank 63 43 3,693 481 83 12 0.09
Norway DnB NOR Bank ASA 63 57 24,295 2,666 308 41 0.56
Oman Bank Muscat SAOG 64 100 958 11 76 1 0.02
Portugal Caixa Geral de Depositos SA - CGD 95 57 7,667 1,928 185 25 0.21
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento 94 57 5,686 1,352 117 29 0.17
Portugal Banco BPI 93 22 2,347 253 60 5 0.11
Qatar Qatar National Bank 56 15 1,904 45 56 3 0.04
Qatar Commercial Bank of Qatar QSC 47 0 661 0 51 0 0.02
Qatar Doha Bank QSC 65 19 568 36 55 3 0.01
Singapore DBS 85 68 14,064 3,195 398 93 0.29
Singapore UOB 86 48 9,678 1,137 282 33 0.24
Singapore Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd 69 46 4,189 1,106 182 32 0.15
South Africa Standard Bank 88 100 4,993 1,205 227 21 0.11
Spain BBVA 79 77 55,402 18,017 781 217 1.50
Spain Banco Santander SA 64 66 46,243 16,121 660 163 0.98
Spain Caja Madrid 55 48 14,825 3,503 114 19 0.34
Sweden Nordea Bank AB 84 88 40,912 7,206 451 75 1.09
Sweden SEB 67 79 20,001 4,510 248 41 0.46
Sweden Svenska Handelsbanken AB 76 91 17,383 3,389 163 33 0.39
Sweden Swedbank Markets 51 53 3,722 626 105 8 0.10
Switzerland Credit Suisse 97 93 167,344 23,598 1,083 155 3.59
Switzerland UBS 97 87 106,681 18,008 854 160 2.31
Taiwan First Commercial Bank Co Ltd 72 63 4,731 1,363 183 24 0.13
Taiwan Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Ltd 72 42 4,544 954 190 33 0.13
Taiwan Mega International Commercial Bank 59 53 5,564 966 276 34 0.11
Taiwan Bank of Taiwan 52 51 3,000 690 170 20 0.08
Taiwan Hua Nan Commercial Bank Ltd 53 26 2,351 301 144 13 0.05
Taiwan Cathay United Bank Co Ltd 28 14 1,051 116 83 10 0.04
Taiwan Fubon Financial Holding Co Ltd 27 25 1,158 364 70 14 0.03
Taiwan Taiwan Cooperative Bank 30 15 1,085 178 62 11 0.03
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Taiwan Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank 47 3 1,184 11 81 2 0.02
Taiwan Chinatrust Commercial Bank 23 47 1,098 661 65 24 0.01
Thailand Bangkok Bank Ltd 86 31 1,024 68 94 8 0.03
Turkey Turkiye Garanti Bankasi AS 100 100 1,123 29 103 2 0.02
UAE Mashreqbank PSC 73 44 2,853 113 147 3 0.04
UAE Emirates NBD PJSC 42 20 2,042 112 155 2 0.04
UK RBS / ABN AMRO 77 79 360,862 44,010 2,930 445 8.33
UK Barclays Capital 78 81 247,708 33,772 1,604 254 4.69
UK HSBC 78 86 144,716 34,130 1,978 422 2.76
UK Lloyds Banking Group 51 60 61,802 11,597 871 122 1.43
UK Standard Chartered Bank 92 89 40,274 8,967 977 170 1.00
UK NM Rothschild 88 100 2,188 7 60 1 0.03
US Citi 48 36 234,311 30,775 1,646 195 4.85
US JPMorgan 27 18 145,908 17,519 788 118 3.18
US Goldman Sachs 52 24 76,400 6,302 204 21 1.47
US Bank of America - Merrill Lynch 15 11 78,935 9,297 692 119 1.41
US Morgan Stanley 49 22 58,251 4,113 210 35 1.12
US GE Capital Markets Inc 24 28 18,074 3,043 275 30 0.47
US Wells - Wachovia Securities 7 5 18,339 2,051 371 40 0.34
US Bank of New York Mellon Corp 6 7 5,035 749 171 17 0.11
US Comerica Bank 13 8 3,664 456 67 14 0.08
Appendix Table A1- cont'd
Share of  cross-
border in total 
lending  (percent)
Volume of cross-





US PNC Bank NA 37 22 25,992 3,763 764 120 0.05
 





Pre-crisis Post-Leh  
man
Pre-crisis Post-Leh  
man
Pre-crisis Post-Leh  
man
Argentina 3,587 382 16 4 79 13 11 10
Australia 96,627 21,781 261 86 968 299 45 47
Austria 11,712 299 27 4 166 16 21 7
Azerbaijan 1,454 198 13 3 93 12 16 8
Belgium 88,158 7,504 86 14 654 67 45 30
Brazil 37,861 1,935 88 14 526 50 32 24
Bulgaria 3,615 39 15 2 111 2 12 1
Canada 109,142 22,490 421 154 1,404 419 46 54
Chile 9,454 538 51 5 312 14 24 11
China 29,170 4,397 176 43 1,027 137 55 37
Croatia 2,440 646 17 6 105 21 15 11
Czech Republic 6,192 1,415 31 5 156 17 14 8
Denmark 59,826 13,913 66 9 441 36 45 23
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3,834 742 19 6 143 32 21 20
Finland 32,365 7,261 56 17 432 80 30 26
France 310,868 26,308 518 55 2,701 175 64 40
Germany 316,539 43,973 363 38 2,294 226 65 49
Greece 18,284 958 72 4 319 15 29 12
Hong Kong, China 57,417 6,494 226 30 1,875 205 57 48
Hungary 8,885 430 25 2 183 16 20 14
Iceland 10,551 4,288 41 1 369 11 39 10
India 31,166 2,265 195 22 1,635 53 68 26
Indonesia 5,042 4,280 52 21 270 65 32 26
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2,552 0 10 0 56 0 8 0
Ireland 20,531 4,241 41 20 237 40 26 16
Italy 83,724 19,630 334 63 1,035 197 43 36
Japan 33,429 11,910 431 90 718 179 34 29
Kazakhstan 16,559 653 70 3 829 17 62 16
Korea, Rep. 20,209 4,708 134 27 817 111 51 30
Kuwait 10,574 1,491 30 7 292 17 40 10
Latvia 2,359 0 24 0 233 0 35 0
Luxembourg 64,336 43,995 40 10 498 108 46 38
Malaysia 16,716 1,600 56 15 299 27 27 11
Mexico 41,019 8,097 100 18 701 115 35 32
Netherlands 155,037 13,078 183 27 1,155 153 63 48
New Zealand 23,184 6,363 99 32 326 114 13 21
Nigeria 2,963 478 15 7 60 12 8 6
Norway 50,639 4,927 216 26 837 62 47 18
Oman 2,740 0 15 0 105 0 20 0
Peru 1,425 487 8 4 54 8 7 7
Philippines 3,004 1,343 21 7 157 40 22 19
Poland 9,788 3,147 30 6 227 34 24 19
Appendix Table A2
Overview of destination countries
Volume of cross-
border lending (USD 
m)
Number of cross-border 
loans
Number of active banks Number of cross-border 
loan portions
This table lists all 60 destination countries in our sample. Pre-crisis refers to the period January 2005-July 2007 and post-Lehman to the
period October 2008-October 2009. Volume of cross-border lending measures the total volume of cross-border syndicated lending to the
country by the banks in our sample in US dollar millions. Number of cross-border loans measures the number of cross-border loans to the
country in which at least one of the banks in our sample was active. Number of cross-border loan portions measures the total number of
individual loan portions provided by the banks in our sample to the country (e.g. one loan with 5 lenders of which 3 foreign lenders implies
three loan portions). Number of active banks measures the number of different banks that were at least 3 times active as cross-border
lenders in the country in the pre-crisis period.
 





Pre-crisis Post-Leh  
man
Pre-crisis Post-Leh  
man
Pre-crisis Post-Leh  
man
Portugal 6,270 2,311 22 5 172 27 27 16
Qatar 13,649 3,379 27 7 232 36 31 19
Romania 3,728 754 36 4 226 18 23 12
Russian Federation 123,809 11,138 326 20 2,856 127 76 34
Saudi Arabia 22,997 0 27 0 270 0 32 0
Slovenia 3,815 1,417 19 7 172 43 22 19
South Africa 22,980 2,973 32 10 334 41 30 30
Spain 183,176 18,993 269 60 1,359 238 46 36
Sweden 66,016 4,605 117 11 664 30 41 15
Switzerland 100,474 17,095 101 16 882 158 56 46
Taiwan, China 9,705 1,326 229 48 491 80 25 19
Thailand 6,512 277 47 5 236 20 28 15
Turkey 41,565 6,615 128 18 1,742 227 71 49
Ukraine 7,565 221 74 4 491 10 38 7
United Arab Emirate 26,941 3,053 69 7 531 22 55 16
United Kingdom 385,362 48,073 700 89 3,216 451 77 75
United States 1,322,710 281,858 4,530 1,053 13,878 3,376 82 85
Vietnam 1,108 408 15 5 34 15 6 14
Appendix Table A2 - cont'd
Volume of cross-
border lending (USD 
m)
Number of cross-border 
loans
Number of cross-border 
loan portions
Number of active banks
  42Variable name Unit Description Source
Data on bank-destination country pairs (# banks = 118 and # of destination countries is 60)
Volume % Change in the amount of cross-border lending by bank i to country j post-Lehman compared to pre-crisis Loan Analytics
Sudden stop 0/1 Dummy that is 1 if lending from bank i to country j declined by 75 per cent or more in the post-Lehman period Loan Analytics
Numbers % Change in the number of cross-border loans by bank i to country j post-Lehman compared to pre-crisis Loan Analytics
Distance km Distance in km between bank i and country j according to the great circle distance formula CIA World Factbook 2005
Subsidiary 0/1 Dummy variable that is 1 if bank i majority owns a bank subsidiary in country j BankScope
Domestic lenders %
Number of different domestic lenders (banks, insurance companies, etc.) in country j with whom bank i has cooperated in a 
syndicate between 2000 and the time of the Lehman Brothers collapse / all domestic lenders
Loan Analytics
Experience No. loans Number of loans provided by bank i to country j since 2000 that had matured by August 2007 Loan Analytics
Exposure %
Outstanding loan volume by bank i to country j as a percentage of total assets of bank i at the time of the Lehman Brothers 
collapse
Loan Analytics
Border  0/1 Dummy variable that is 1 if the home country of bank i and country j share a common border CIA World Factbook 2005
Common language 0/1 Dummy variable that is 1 if the home country of bank i and country j share the same dominant language CIA World Factbook 2005
Colonial links 0/1
Dummy variable that is 1 if the home country of bank i and country j shared the same colonizer or one country used to be 
the colony of the other country
CIA World Factbook 2005
Credit info points
Difference between the score of the home country of bank i and country j on a credit information index that captures rules 
affecting scope, access and quality of credit information
Doing Business
Legal difference points Dummy variable that is 1 if the origin of the legal system of the home country of bank i and country j differ CIA World Factbook 2005
Bank data (# banks = 118)
State support 0/1 Dummy that is one if bank i received government support during the financial crisis Internet, various publications
Bank size USD billion Total assets of bank i BankScope
Bank solvency % Equity to total assets of bank i BankScope
Change bank solvency % point Change in bank solvency BankScope
Bank liquidity % Liquid assets to deposits and other short-term funding of bank i BankScope























This table presents definitions and sources of all variables used in the paper. Pre-crisis refers to the period Jan 2005-July 2007 and post-Lehman to the period Oct 2008-Oct 2009. Loan Analytics is Dealogic's Loan Analytics database on 
syndicated loans. BankScope is Bureau van Dijk's database of bank balance sheet and income statement data. IFS are the International Financial Statistics provided by the International Monetary Fund. Doing Business is the World Bank 
Doing Business Survey (2008). The variables Distance, Experience and Bank size are included in logs in the regressions.
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